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Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini [3]Marianna B. Ganapini [1]
  1. Confabulating Reasons.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini & Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):189-201.
    In this paper, I will focus on a type of confabulation that emerges in relation to questions about mental attitudes whose causes we cannot introspectively access. I argue against two popular views that see confabulations as mainly offering a psychological story about ourselves. On these views, confabulations are the result of either a cause-tracking mechanism or a self-directed mindreading mechanism. In contrast, I propose the view that confabulations are mostly telling a normative story: they are arguments primarily offered to justify (...)
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    Against normativism about mental attitudes.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):295-311.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 3, Page 295-311, September 2021.
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    Doubting Assertion.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):1-13.
    One main argument that has been offered in support of the Knowledge Account of Assertion is that it successfully makes sense of a variety of Moorean-paradoxical claims. David Sosa has objected to the Knowledge Account by arguing that it does not generalize satisfactorily to make sense of the oddity of iterated conjunctions of the form “p but I don’t know whether I know that p”. Recently, Martin Montminy has offered a defense of the Knowledge Account. In this paper, I show (...)
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    Absurd Stories, Ideologies & Motivated Cognition.Marianna B. Ganapini - 2022 - Philosophical Topics 50 (2):21-39.
    At times, weird stories such as the Pizzagate spread surprisingly quickly and widely. In this paper I analyze the mental attitudes of those who seem to take those absurdities seriously: I argue that those stories are often imagined rather than genuinely believed. Then I make room for the claim that often these imaginings are used to support group ideologies. My main contribution is to explain how that support actually happens by showing that motivated cognition can employ imagination as a seemingly (...)
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